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This paper discusses the reasons for the change in economic policy direction adopted 
in New Zealand in  1984. The paper briefly outlines the economic history of New 
Zealand in the period from the early 1970's to 1996. The ultimate test of the success 
of the economic reforms is whether they have increased the growth rate of potential 
per capita output in the economy. I discuss the evidence on this hypothesis and 
conclude that the evidence does support the hypothesis of a structural change in this 
measure. Five of  the major areas of  reform are discussed, these areas are goods, 
capital  and  labour  market  liberalisation  and  the  fiscal  and  monetary  policy 
framework adopted in New Zealand. 
Keywords: economic policy reform, New Zealand 
Tiivistelma 
Tiissa keskustelualoitteessa kiisitelliiiin Uudessa-Seelannissa vuonna 1984 aloitetun 
talouspolitiikan suunnan muutoksen syita. Siina myos hahrnotellaan lyhyesti Uuden- 
Seelannin historiaa 1970-luvun alusta vuoteen 1996 saakka. Taloudellisten uudis- 
tusten onnistuminen testataan viime kadessa siinii, miten ne ovat lisiinneet talouden 
potentiaalisen  kansantuotteen  kasvuvauhtia.  Kiisittelen  hypoteesiin  perustuvaa 
aineistoa, jonka  katson tukevan rakennemuutokseen perustuvaa hypoteesia tassa 
suhteessa. Tarkastelun kohteena on viisi keskeista uudistusaluetta: hyodyke-, paa- 
oma- ja tyovoimamarkkinoiden vapauttaminen seka Uudessa-Seelannissa omaksuttu 
finanssi- ja rahapolitiikka. 
Avainsanat: talouden rakennemuutos, Uusi-Seelanti 
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Tii  vistelmä 
Tässä keskustelualoitteessa käsitellään Uudessa-Seelannissa vuonna 1984 aloitetun 
talouspolitiikan suunnan muutoksen syitä. Siinä myös hahmotellaan lyhyesti Uuden-
Seelannin historiaa 1970-luvun alusta vuoteen 1996 saakka. Taloudellisten uudis-
tusten onnistuminen testataan viime kädessä siinä, miten ne ovat lisänneet talouden 
potentiaalisen  kansantuotteen  kasvuvauhtia.  Käsittelen  hypoteesiin  perustuvaa 
aineistoa, jonka katson tukevan rakennemuutokseen perustuvaa hypoteesia tässä 
suhteessa. Tarkastelun kohteena on viisi keskeistä uudistusaluetta: hyödyke-, pää-
oma-ja  työvoimamarkkinoiden vapauttaminen sekä Uudessa-Seelannissa omaksuttu 
finanssi- ja rahapolitiikka. 
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5 Introduction 
Since the late 1970s many countries have adopted a more liberal market oriented 
economy to increase the living standards of their citizens; New Zealand is one such 
country. At this stage, it is still difficult to say whether the reforms have been a 
success, but evidence strongly points us in this direction. As a result of this success, 
Governments and academics from around the world have become interested in the 
approaches taken in New Zealand in an attempt to understand their impact and to 
study the feasibility of adopting them in their own country. 
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the reforms undertaken in New 
Zealand and their likely effects. The paper starts in Chapter 1 with a discussion of the 
background that led New Zealanders to dramatically change an economic course that 
was set by the Labour Government in 1935. The goals of the reforms and the main 
areas of  reform are discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 analyses the effect of  the 
reforms on the potential output of the economy. Five key areas of reform are selected 
and briefly analysed in Chapter 4. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 5. The paper 
contains two appendices. The first appendix is a list of the reforms completed, while 
the second is a graphical appendix of the major macroeconomic variables. 
Background 
i 
!  The New Zealand economy has been highly regulated since its colonial days. Last  * 
I  century New  Zealand's  primary reason for existence was to provide cheap meat, 
dairy products and wool for the United Kingdom. Even today, many elderly New 
I 
i  Zealanders refer to the United Kingdom as the "mother country". During times of 
f 
I  war, New  Zealand provided the UK  with soldiers. New  Zealand  also accepted 
;  rationing of its plentiful food resources so that they could be exported to the UK at 
i 
little more than cost, to sustain the war effort. New Zealand's foreign policy could be  a 
f 
stated in five words; "Where Britain stands, we stand." 
Reliance on the UK  market proved to be very favourable to the UK  during 
t  wartime and to New Zealand in peace time. In fact, by the mid-1950s New Zealand 
1  was the worlds third richest country in per capita terms. New Zealand was heavily 
1  reliant on exports to one market and on only a few core commodities which required  1  little value added, little marketing and a relatively uneducated workforce. 
I  New Zealand's wealth allowed politicians to set up a system of "cradle to the 
I 
I  grave"  welfare which was heavily directed from Wellington (the capital) via an 
i 
I  incomes policy, industrial policy, trade policy and fiscal and monetary policy. Use of 
I 
1 
these policies was never very coherent and more often than not policy was used to 
I  adjust for a perceived social injustice rather than on economic grounds. 
I  The primary focus of  economic policy  was  on the  labour market, and in 
I  particular, full employment within the labour market. Wages were bargained for at 
the industry level with the Unions goal to achieve the highest real wages possible for 
their workers and the Government's goal to achieve full employment. This resulted 
in disequilibrium in the labour market which was sustained by manipulation of trade, 
industrial, fiscal and monetary policy tools in order to achieve the Government's 
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7 goal.  Thus  trade  policy  and  industrial  policy  were  directed  towards  import 
substitution and export promotion via subsidies, tariffs, quotas and import licences. 
When woxld trade policy forced New Zealand to lower tariffs, the reaction was to 
increase non-tariff barriers. 
Monetary policy was directed towards manipulation of  a Keynesian Phillips 
curve and the Reserve Bank Act of 1964 directed the Reserve Bank to use monetary 
policy to maintain the highest level of output, employment, trade and lowest level of 
inflation possible. Monetary policy tools consisted of a fixed exchange rate, fixed 
interest  rates,  reserve  asset  ratios  and  investment  ratios  which  allowed  the 
Government to determine where the private sector could invest their money. Fiscal 
policy was used to supply the Government with revenue to finance the system of 
subsidies and welfare payments and was also used to dampen economic cycles. 
During the period from the second world war, New Zealand experienced higher 
average inflation than its trading partners, and slower economic growth. However, 
the primary problem New Zealand suffered was low productivity growth. Thus New 
Zealand's income per capita in relation to other OECD countries fell continuously 
from the 1950s to the early 1990s. 
Between 1972 and 1975 New Zealand suffered a series of externally sourced 
economic shocks. The first shock was a positive but temporary rise in agricultural 
prices resulting in a major rise in the terms of trade. 
The rise in the price of agricultural products in 1972173 was caused by  a series 
a  of frosts across the northern hemisphere which destroyed much of the grain crop. The 
i 
i  rise in agricultural product prices caused the terms of trade to rise from 98.9 in 
i  September 1971 to a peak of 145.4 in June 1973'. Because the exchange rate was not 
i  floating, the appreciation in the exchange rate was not enough to fully offset the rise 
I 
a  in the terms of trade, thus demand grew rapidly with capacity utilisation reaching 
1  record levels of 92 percent in June 1973 and unemployment falling to 0,25 percent 
8  by March 1974. This rise in demand was soon translated to rising prices. Consumer 
price inflation rose from 5.5 percent in the year to June 1972 to 10.2 percent in the 
year to June 1973 (inflation peaked in March 1980 at 18.4 per~ent)~.  Adjustment to 
this shock was compounded by  the actions of Government, which appears to have 
viewed the shock as permanent. Government expanded welfare payments, introduced 
a Government provided accident compensation scheme and a partly funded national 
superannuation (which was replaced in 1976 by an unfunded scheme). These policies 
locked the Government into a higher level of spending resulting in a structural budget 
B 
deficit. 
;  By 1974 world agricultural prices began falling and the first oil shock impacted 
I 
i 
on the economy. These problems were compounded by  the entry of  the United 
!  Kingdom into the European Economic Community. The terms of trade fell from a 
E  peak of  145.4 in June 1973 to a trough of 80.5 in December 1975.  Although the  1  exchange rate fell by  20 percent between June 1974 and September 1975, this fall 
was insufficient to insulate the economy and intensified inflationary pressures.  , 
'  The index is adjusted so that March 1970 = 100. 
Headline CPI inflation briefly rose to 20 percent per annum in 1986 as a result of the introduction 
of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) of 10 percent on all goods and services. 
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8 The ineffectual policy response to the shocks to the terms of trade in 1972-1 974 
was to last until 1984. Although many different policies were tried, they were not 
followed consistently and were often based on either short term stabilisation or 
political expediency. Evans, Grimes, Teece  and Wilkinson point  out  that  New 
Zealand's  poor macroeconomic performance resulted primarily from the inward 
looking regulatory economic policies followed from the 1930's. However, the shocks 
to the terms of trade were significant in highlighting the unsustainability of these 
policies. 
In December 1974 the New Zealand dollar was worth US  1.3 1, by  December 
1984 it was worth 49 US cents. Unemployment rose at every successive business 
cycle regardless of Government attempts to maintain full employment. New Zealand 
suffered continual and rising Government budget and current account deficits. GDP 
growth between June 1977 and June 1984 averaged 1.8 percent. 
In comparison, growth over the seven years from June  1988 to June  1995 
averaged 2.5 percent  (between June  1991 and June  1995 growth averaged 4.6 
percent). New Zealand's current account is still in deficit but the Government budget 
posted a surplus of 3 percent of GDP in 1994195 and forecast to post a larger surplus 
in  1995196.  Unemployment  rose  throughout  the  early  phases  of  the  reform 
programme. At  the time of  the introduction of  the  Employment Contracts Act 
unemployment was 10  percent (in the June quarter of  1991). Unemployment peaked 
at  11.1 percent  in March  1992 and has  since fallen  sharply to 5.9 percent  in 
September 1995. Since 1991, employment has grown by  over 180 000. The New 
Zealand dollar has strengthened and is currently worth around 67 US cents. What 
makes the performance of  New  Zealand post  1991 unusual, is the fact that the 
expansion in economic activity has been  accompanied by  a weak  international 
outlook,  strong  fiscal  discipline,  price  stability  and  unprecedented consumer 
confidence. Typical expansions in New Zealand are either accompanied by a world 
boom or activist fiscal or monetary (or both) policies. 
To understand why the reforms took place and the type of reforms implemented, 
one has to understand the period from 1972 to 1984. The reforms did not just appear, 
many  of  the  policies  implemented were  developed  or  discussed  long  before 
implementation, with at least two attempts to move down the reform path between 
1975 and 19843. 
The first attempt at liberalisation occurred in  1979 with the relaxation of price controls and import 
regulations. The second attempt was a failed leadership bid by  a known reformer Mr Derek Quigley, 
in  1980. 
9 
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9 2  The reform process 
Much of  the reform process in New Zealand has been focused on improving the 
microeconomic  allocation  of  resources.  Traditional  macroeconomic  policies 
designed  for  short-run  stabilisation  and  growth  have  been  replaced  by 
macroeconomic policies aimed at achieving longer-term objectives combined with 
increased transparency of policy action to provide agents with superior information 
with which to make rational decisions. 
The basic thrust of the reforms in New Zealand are to: 
1.  Promote the optimal use of scarce resources by the creation and maintenance of 
a competitive market environment in which the role of Government is primarily 
to ensure competitive behaviour of private agents and secure rights and assign 
costs where it is believed that there is market failure. 
2.  Ensure  that  any  Government  intervention  in  the  market  is  to  improve 
competition and be as neutral between market participants as possible. 
3.  Ensure that Government actions are aimed at improving the medium term 
outlook. 
4.  Ensure that Government actions are transparent in such a manner that market 
participants can make informed decisions regarding the results of Government 
actions. 
The reforms can be broken into three different groups (see Appendix 1 for the timing 
of reform policies). 
t  1.  Structural reforms 
Trade liberalisation 
Liberalisation of industrial policy 
Labour market liberalisation 
Taxation reforms 
Liberalisation of the capital account 
Sale of Government market enterprises 
Liberalisation of foreign direct investment 
Promote sustainable use of scarce resources 
Promote multilateral international trade agreements 
Liberalise immigration laws 
2.  Fiscal reforms 
Reduction and then maintenance of Government debt at prudent levels 
Transparency of fiscal policy 
Improve Government sector productivity 
Corporatisation of remaining Government market enterprises 
Introduction of  user  charges for Government services where costs can be 
assigned 
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10 3.  Monetary reforms 
Autonomy of operation for the central bank 
Targeting monetary policy at inflation 
Transparency in monetary policy 
Removal of interest rate and credit controls 
Timing of the reforms 
The reform process began with the election of the Labour Government in July 1984. 
The Labour Government reacted to a foreign exchange crisis, which occurred during 
the election, by  devaluing the New  Zealand dollar by  20 percent and removing 
interest rate controls. Monetary policy was tightened to regain control of the money 
supply and restrictions on the payment of interest on short-term bank deposits and 
cheque accounts were removed.  Controls on New Zealanders borrowing overseas 
were also removed.  The Budget of 1984 removed the wage and price freeze (in place 
since  1982) and  introduced measures to control public  expenditure, including 
phasing out of land-based subsidies.  Prices for electricity and coal were raised over 
time, to levels which reflected the costs of production.  Finally, the tax base was 
widened. 
Financial liberalisation was continued in December 1984, with the removal of 
controls on the purchase of foreign exchange. This was followed on March 4 1985 
with the floating of the New Zealand dollar. 
Trade reform continued, with the schedule for phasing out of import licences 
and tariff reductions finalised in September 1985.  Further tariff reductions were 
implemented to ease the implicit tax on agriculture resulting from subsidies being 
removed faster than tariffs.  In  1986, the main focus of  the Government was on 
taxation reform and the reform of state enterprises (especially those which operated 
in a market environment). These state industries were reorganised in the first stage 
of privatisation. Taxation changes consisted of a flat Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
of  10 percent, which was introduced on  1 October 1986, combined with a fall in 
marginal tax rates on companies and labour incomes. 
The Government "corporatised" major industrial activities into State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE's) on 1 April 1987. These new Government corporations included 
Electricity Corporation, Forestry Corporation, Land  Corporation, Telecom New 
Zealand, New  Zealand  Post, the  Post Office Bank,  Coal  Corporation, Airways 
Corporation and Government Property Services. The corporatisation process was the 
second stage towards privatisation of these enterprises. Corporatisation effectively 
gave the Government the rights of a 100 percent shareholder and gave management 
responsibility for the efficient operation of the businesses. 
On December 17 1987, the Government announced a major fiscal initiative (the "flat 
tax package") including; 
1.  A programme of  asset sales to be used to repay  113 of  Government debt by 
1992, 
2.  A single personal income tax (flat tax) on income, to be announced in February 
1988 and take effect on 1 October 1988, 
3.  A reduction in company income taxes, 
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responsibility for the efficient operation of  the businesses. 
On December 17 1987, the Government announced a major fiscal initiative (the "fiat 
tax package") including; 
1.  A programme of asset sales to be used to repay  1/3 of Government debt by 
1992, 
2.  A single personal income tax (fiat tax) on income, to be announced in February 
1988 and take effect on 1 October 1988, 
3.  A reduction in company income taxes, 
11 4.  A four year programme of  tariff reduction on goods not subject to industrial 
plans. 
In February  1988, the Prime Minister suspended the flat tax package. The top 
marginal income tax rate decided upon in 1988 was 33 percent (between 1986 and 
1988 the top marginal tax rate on income was 48 percent, prior to 1986 the top 
marginal tax rate was 66 percent). The rejection of the taxation package of December 
17 1987 highlighted the rising tensions that had developed between the Minister of 
Finance and the Prime Minister, and heralded a slow-down and weakening of  the 
pace of reform. 
1988 was a difficult year for the New Zealand economy as a recession spread 
from agriculture and manufacturing to construction and services. Although output 
fell further in the recession of  199  1 (than 1988), the recession in 1988 was in many 
ways deeper. In particular, business confidence fell lower in  1988 than in  1991, 
labour force participation plunged from 66.5 to 63 percent of  the labour force and 
total hours worked fell further in 1988 than 1991. 
The main reform introduced in 1989 was the Reserve Bank Act. This Act came 
into effect on 1 February 1990. The Government also removed restrictions on the 
ownership of New Zealand ports and further reduced tariff rates. In June 1990, the 
largest privatisation of a Government owned corporation occurred when Telecom 
New Zealand was sold for 4.25 Billion New Zealand dollars. Education policy was 
also changed in  1990 with  a flat fee of  1250 dollars charged on all university 
students. 
In October 1990, the conservative National party was elected Government. The 
Government was faced with a large increase in the budget deficit and forecasts of 
worsening deficits, a bank bail-out and a substantial recession. After six years of 
reform it seemed to many that New Zealand was in fact worse off in 1990 than it had 
been in 1984. The response of the Government to this crisis was to ignore much of 
its social policy campaign promises and launch its Economic and Social Initiative. 
This package introduced the Employment Contracts Act, froze Government pension 
payments for one year, reduced benefits, (including the unemployment benefit and 
minimum wage) and tightened the eligibility of benefits. User pays in education was 
also increased with the setting of student fees transferred to Universities, the means 
testing of Government support and the introduction of  a student loans system. The 
policy of contracting fiscal policy in the face of a recession was criticised by  many 
including economics professors and members of the Government. However, the peak 
of the recession was in the first half of the first year of the new administration (199 1) 
and by September 199  1 the recovery had begun. 
The  Government  increased  the  pace  of  reform  in  the  Budget  of  1991, 
introducing a new immigration system based on eligibility points that emphasised 
skills. The Budget also introduced user charges for health services and raised the age 
of  entitlement for national superannuation from 60 to 65 years  (to be raised in 
stages). The Resource Management Act (1991) was passed by  Parliament, this Act 
aims to co-ordinate policies directed to the sustainable use of natural resources. The 
Government also introduced policies increasing the rental on public owned housing 
to market levels and allowing long-term tenants of public housing to purchase their 
house. 
Pressure on the Government to slow the pace of  the reforms mounted from 
1991, with some National members of Parliament rebelling against the Government. 
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12 The response of  the Government has been to slow the pace of  change down and 
introduce, especially in the field of  social services, more inter-party discussion. 
Strong public pressure against the present First Past the Post (FPP) electoral system 
resulted in a referendum on whether to change the electoral system to a Proportional 
Representation  (PR)  system.  The  first  Mixed  Member  Proportional  (MMP) 
representation election will occur in November 1996. 
Over the course of  1994, New Zealand received a credit upgrade by  Moody's 
credit rating service, placing New Zealand's long-term Government debt credit rating 
above that of  Australia. The Government announced a small surplus for the fiscal 
year 1993194 and forecast larger surpluses for 1994195 and 1995196. Over 1993194, 
the recovery moved to the service and construction sectors of  the economy, with 
general GDP growth of  5,l percent (Q4/Q4) in  1993 and 6.1 percent (44144) in 
1994. 1994 was also the year that the Fiscal Responsibility Act was passed. The 
Fiscal Responsibility Act aims to improve fiscal discipline by forcing Governments 
to  follow prudent  fiscal policies,  the  Act  uses  tighter  standards on  reporting, 
accounting, timing of reports as a method of making Government accountable for its 
actions (See chapter 4 for details). At the end of  1994, Standard and Poors followed 
Moody's and upgraded New Zealand's foreign currency debt rating from AA- to AA. 
The Government produced a surplus operating balance  of  2.6 billion New 
Zealand dollars for the fiscal year 1994195 and forecast 1995196 surplus to be 3.2 
billion dollars. In the June quarter of  1995, the Reserve Bank breached its inflation 
target with an annual inflation rate of 2.2 percent, largely as a result of unexpectedly 
robust growth in 1994. 
In December 1995 the Government announced a tax cut/social policy initiative 
to be implemented in July 1996. The focus of the tax cuts would be on lowering the 
marginal tax rate on lower and middle income brackets. Social spending would be 
increased in the fields of education and health. It is forecast that this fiscal loosening 
will not endanger either the existence of further surpluses or the inflation target. It is 
planned for there to be further tax cuts in the future. In January 1996, Standard and 
Poors further upgraded New Zealand's foreign currency debt rating. 
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13 The effect of the reforms: Potential output 
The most important measure of the success or failure of the reforms in New Zealand 
is the effect that they have on the rate of potential output growth. The measurement 
of potential output in New Zealand is complicated by the lack of data on the capital 
stock. Measures of the capital stock using the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM)4  are 
not going to be very accurate as the reforms resulted in much capital scrapping and 
so it would be  difficult to determine the  average life of  an  investment in  any 
particular industry"  Thus the production function-approach to the measurement df 
potential output is not going to yield reliable results. Similarly, univariate filters such 
as simple moving averages or the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter will also tend to 
yield biased results. Therefore, less traditional approaches must be used to determine 
the effect of reform on potential output. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) studied the economic policies of  109 countries from 
1969 to 1989 and found that the countries with the fastest economic growth tended 
to have higher investment/GDP ratios, lower Government consumption/GDP ratios, 
high export/GDP ratios, lower inflation, a higher stock of human capital and fewer 
trade and capital control distortions. The IMF studied international data on potential 
output growth, and concluded that higher potential output growth is robust (in the 
Learner (1983), (1985) sense) to increases in the investment1GDP ratio which in turn 
is systematically related to the trade share of GDP. In other words, countries with 
higher average growth tend to have higher rates of import penetration and higher 
investment ratios.  The  other  effects  identified by  Levene  and  Renelt  may  be 
significant but were not empirically robust in the presence of the investment/GDP 
ratio. This may be because of a problem of causation ie. These policies cause higher 
investment and therefore appear non-robust in the regression estimation. 
New Zealand has achieved a rise in the investment/GDP ratio from about 25 
percent prior to the reforms to 31 percent in  1994195, According to Levine and 
Renelt, a one percent rise in the investment/GDP ratio leads to an average increase 
S  in the growth rate of potential output of 0.175 percent per year. A six percent rise in 
1  the investment/GDP ratio is therefore consistent with a rise in potential growth of 
1.05 percent per annum. 
Fischer (1991) presents a panel data study that indicates that the reduction in 
inflation has had a considerable influence on the increase in investment experienced 
in New Zealand. Inflation influences investment by increasing the interest rate risk 
premium charged on capital (increases investors risk aversion) and lowers total factor 
productivity by  creating price distortions of  the type  outlined in Lucas (1973). 
I  Fischer's panel regression estimates would imply that the increased investment rate 
was responsible for a rise in potential output of 0.75 percent while the decline in 
j 
inflation was responsible for an increase of about 0.14 percent6. 
I 
The PIM determines the size of the capital stock by adding up the growth of investment each year 
and assigning an average lifetime to each investment category based on its likely depreciation rate. 
See Mayes and Young (1994) for a discussion. 
* The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is currently funding research into the construction of a capital 
stock series but the results so far are not encouraging. 
The work of Fischer implies that there exists a downward sloping long-run supply curve, which I 
find difficult to accept without further evidence. Garrison and Lee (1995) challenge the findings of 
Fischer regarding the effect of inflation on growth. 
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14 Estimates of the pre-reform rate of per capita output growth between 1950 and 
1985 are in the order of  1.6 percent per year. If  we accept the work of Levine and 
Renelt and Fischer then per capita output growth has been raised to a minimum of 
2.6 percent per year. Population growth in New Zealand is in the region of  1 percent 
therefore potential output growth is in the range of 3.5 to 4 percent per year. This 
result accords well with the prior beliefs of the Treasury and Reserve Bank, who 
believe that it is in the range of  3 to 4.5 percent per year7. This is a lower bound 
estimate because it only allows for the investmenUGDP ratio effect which was the 
only robust determinant in Levene and Renelt. 
The growth rate of  investment in plant and machinerys continues to be high 
despite considerable tightening of  monetary  conditions. This indicates that  the 
investmenUGDP ratio may  still be  rising.  With the  continuation of  the  reform 
programme, especially tariff reductions and fiscal consolidation, and with the lagged 
effects of the reforms still coming through, the potential output growth rate may also 
still be risingg. 
Ten year Government bond rate averaged 7.86 percent over the period between 
September 1991 and December 1995. If we assume that the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand does not have perfect credibility and therefore the expected inflation rate is 
the upper point of the target band, ie 2 percent, it leaves the real interest rate on ten 
year Government bonds at 5.86 percent. A real interest rate at this level is considered 
by most economists to be high, yet investment in plant and machinery over the same 
period has averaged 20.7 percent per annum. Investment is at present responding to 
restrictive monetary policy but the underlying growth rate appears to be considerably 
higher post 199  1. 
One explanation of this high real interest rate is that it is consistent with New 
Zealand moving to a higher equilibrium level of the capital stocklo. Thus the reforms 
resulted in the optimal capital stock rising while at the same time the removal of 
tariffs  and subsidies resulted in the scrapping of redundant capital. This had the effect 
of increasing the gap between the current capital stock and the desired capital stock 
and therefore raised the marginal product of capital and hence the equilibrium real 
interest rate. As the capital stock increases, the marginal product of  capital will 
decline and therefore the real interest rate will also decline towards the utility rate of 
time preference. This process is taking time because international capital markets are 
not perfect and investment projects take time to build. The high real interest rates are 
also an indication that the economy has a great deal of latent growth with which to 
sustain a high rate of growth in potential output. 
The conclusion that can be tentatively drawn from this analysis is that potential 
output growth has undergone a structural change, with New Zealand moving to a 
higher growth path. This will ultimately result in a higher sustainable consumption 
path for New Zealanders. 
'Monetary Policy Statement, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Dec 1995, p. 39. 
* Because of the  major fall in  the  price of computers, and the  fact that New Zealand's National 
Accounts are still based in  1982183, the  computer deflator inflates the  total  investment statistics 
creating a major  distortion. Investment in  plant  and  machinery  avoids this  deflator problem  by 
excluding computer investment. 
Because of the short time since the reforms, it is statistically difficult to determine whether there has 
been a structural break and if there has been one, what size it is. 
lo See Barro, R. J. (1984), Macroeconomics. John Wiley and Sons, pp 278-281. 
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15 What were the key reforms 
Determining what the key reforms New Zealand implemented were, is a complex 
empirical  question.  In  the  absence  of  extensive  econometric analysis  (and  a 
sophisticated econometric model), the selection of the reforms that contributed most 
to the increase in potential output in New Zealand then becomes one of subjective 
judgement and is of course open to debate. 
I have selected five reforms which I believe have contributed extensively to the 
increase in potential output experienced in New Zealand. The selection of  these 
reforms is not arbitrary. The first three reform areas target the goods, capital and 
labour markets. The remaining two reforms govern the two main instruments of 
policy; monetary and fiscal policy. Of these five reforms, trade reform has increased 
the  efficiency of  the goods market by  opening New  Zealand businesses, both 
exporters and importers, to international competition. The Employment Contracts 
Act (1991) opened New Zealand's labour market to competition through enterprise 
and individual level wage bargaining. Capital market liberalisation has allowed 
individuals, firms and banks to invest their money consistent with their individual 
risklreturn  trade-offs.  The  Reserve  Bank  Act  (1989)  lays  the  foundations of 
responsible and stable monetary policy. Finally, the Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994), 
encourages the Government to follow "prudent"  fiscal policies. 
In the selection of these five reforms, I do not belittle other reforms which will 
have a profound impact on the New  Zealand economy and the people of  New 
Zealand. The Resource Management Act aims to increase the sustainable use of 
natural resources, as does the transferable fishing quota system. Immigration policy 
now emphasises the skills of prospective immigrants. The privatisation programme 
has undoubtedly raised the productivity of those enterprises privatised, as well as 
(generally) improved their services. The cuts to welfare benefits and the reduction in 
the minimum wage (to below the labour market equilibrium) have lowered workers 
reservation wage, increasing employment and improving the Government's accounts. 
New Zealanders are putting increasing emphasis on education and training. Changes 
to taxation have removed many of the high marginal tax rates faced by low income 
earners and has broadened the tax base. Increasing the emphasis of  taxation on 
consumption  has  lowered  the  disincentives to  labour  effort,  and  because  the 
consumption tax is equally applied to all goods, it has reduced the distortionary 
effects that the old system of sales taxes contained. Finally, the liberalisation of the 
trading environment New Zealand faces, in the form of the free trade agreement with 
Australia  and  the  GATT  Uruguay  round, has  increased New  Zealand's  export 
opportunities (manufactures to Australia, primary commodities to the EU, US, Japan 
and Korea). 
New Zealand is yet to see some of the longer term benefits of the reforms. The 
Government  has  announced  its  intention to  increase  spending on  health  and 
education and provide for successive annual tax cuts from July 1996".  Similarly, 
New Zealand is moving to a mixed member proportional representation electoral 
system, so the path of Government policy in the future is difficult to determine. 
"  See the Conclusion for an outline of the tax package. 
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eamers and has broadened the tax base.  Increasing the emphasis of taxation on 
consumption  has  lowered  the  disincentives  to  labour  effort,  and  because  the 
consumption tax is equally applied to all goods, it has reduced the distortionary 
effects that the old system of sales taxes contained. Finally, the liberalisation of the 
trading environment New Zealand faces, in the form of the free trade agreement with 
Australia and  the  GATT  Uruguay  round,  has  increased  New  Zealand's  export 
opportunities (manufactures to Australia, primary commodities to the EU, US, Japan 
ånd Korea). 
New Zealand is yet to see some of the longer term benefits of  the reforms. The 
Govemment  has  announced  its  intention  to  increase  spending  on  health  and 
education and provide for successive annual tax cuts from July 1996
11
• Similarly, 
New Zealand is moving to a mixed member proportional representation electoral 
system, so the path of Govemment policy in the future is difficult to determine. 
Il See the Conclusion for an outline of the tax package. 
16 Trade reform 
By  1979 it was  realised that New  Zealand's  high  rate  of  trade protection  was 
weakening competition, placing upward pressure on inflation and an implicit tax on 
exporters.  The  Government  began  a  programme  of  protection  reduction  and 
introduced Supplementary Minimum Prices (SMP's) for agriculture in an effort to 
reduce the implicit tax on agriculture. The Government later opened up dialogue with 
Australia on the possibility of improved access to the Australian market. 
By  1984, the cost of SMP's were rising, placing a burden on public finances. 
SMP's were distorting agricultural production (leading to a rise in sheep numbers 
when  they  should have been  falling), building themselves into land prices  and 
resulting in a deadweight loss to society. The new  Government in  1984 rapidly 
removed  agricultural support,  including SMP's.  However, the  implicit  tax  on 
agriculture remained, contributing to an agricultural recession from 1984 to 1989. 
The Government dismantled a host of export incentives, producer board subsidies 
and trade restrictions. The Government also began to seriously remove import 
protection. 
The first step of  the programme of  import protection removal consisted of 
dismantling the system of import licences, this was completed in 1992. The second 
stage of the programme was tariff reduction. In 1987 a five step tariff reduction plan 
was put into effect covering the period 1988-1992.  Another plan was affected later, 
covering the period  1992-1996,  cutting tariffs by  113.  In  1994 a further tariff 
reduction plan was forrnalised for the period 19962000. 
Table 1.  Global Rates of Assistance 
March Years  1985186  1987188  1989190  1992193  1996197 
Import substitution sector 
Nominal  27  21  16  12  7 
Effective  n.a.  36  28  n.a.  n.a. 





Source: Duncan et al. (1992) 
As at 1996, high (by OECD standards) tariffs still remained on carpets, other textiles, 
clothing, footwear, new and used motor vehicles and some types of machinery, the 
tariff reduction plan starting in 1996 aims to lower tariffs on these goods. 
Other factors had important consequences for New Zealand's trade position. In 
1990, New Zealand completed a free trade agreement with Australia. New Zealand 
has  also put  considerable resources into pushing  for  a  GATT  Uruguay  round 
settlement which includes agriculture. The successful completion of the GATT will 
result in potentially substantial benefits to New Zealand. New Zealand also supports 
APEC's move towards a free trade area in the Pacific, and multilateral free trade in 
general. New Zealand would stand to loose more than most countries if trade was to 
break down into large international trading blocks. 
Trade reform 
By  1979 it was  realised that  New Zealand's high  rate of trade  protection  was 
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protection. 
The first  step of the programme of import protection removal consisted of 
dismantling the system of  import licences, this was completed in 1992. The second 
stage of  the programme was tariff reduction. In ·1987 a five step tariff reduction pIan 
was put into effect covering the period 1988-1992. Another pIan was affected later, 
covering the period  1992-1996, cutting tariffs  by  1/3.  In 1994 a  further  tariff 
reduction pIan was formalised for the period 1996-2000. 
Table 1.  Global Rates of  Assistance 
March Years  1985/86  1987/88  1989/90  1992/93  1996/97 
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Effective  n.a.  36  28  n.a.  n.a. 
TRUE  3  3  3  2  1 
Export Sector 
Nominal  10  5  4  3  2 
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TRUE  -11  -11  -8  -6  -4 
Source: Duncan et al. (1992) 
As at 1996, high (by OECD standards) tariffs still remained on carpets, other textiles, 
clothing, footwear, new and used motor vehicles and some types of machinery, the 
tariff reduction pIan starting in 1996 aims to lower tariffs on these goods. 
Other factors had important consequences for New Zealand's trade position. In 
1990, New Zealand completed a free trade agreement with Australia. New Zealand 
has  also  put considerable  resources  into  pushing  for  a  GATT  Uruguay  round 
settlement which includes agriculture. The successful completion of  the GATT will 
result in potentially substantial benefits to New Zealand. New Zealand also supports 
APEC's move towards a free trade area in the Pacific, and multilateral free trade in 
general. New Zealand would stand to loose more than most countries if  trade was to 
break down into large intemational trading blocks. 
17 The Employment Contracts Act (1991) 
The ECA is.designed to increase efficiency in the labour market. The Act provides 
for freedom of  association (voluntary unionism)  and  the  choice of  workers to 
determine who represents their interests. The Act also allows employers to negotiate 
directly with individual workers if both parties agree. 
The success of this Act must also be seen in the light of Government reductions 
in the minimum wage and the unemployment benefit12. Theory suggests that this has 
lowered  workers  reservation  wage  and  hence  lowered  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment  13. 
Beaumont and Jolly (1993) state that the primary effect of the ECA was to 
enhance the fall-back position of employers in wage bargaining by  making strikes 
and lockouts less costly. Beaumont and Jolly also point out that the Act reduces the 
bargaining power of unions by allowing employers to initiate direct negotiations with 
employees, and in the event of a strike, to hire non-union labour. 
One  of  the principal benefits of  the  ECA  to the  Reserve  Bank  is that  it 
decentralises bargaining from occupational and industry awards to individual and 
enterprise awards. This increases the cost to fms  of increases in wages. An increase 
in the real wage that is not offset by an increase in productivity, will directly weaken 
the firm's profitability and competitiveness relative to other firms. Thus firms have 
an increased incentive to prevent excessive wage rises. This tightens the relationship 
between real wages and productivity and makes real wages more responsive to 
changes in unemployment. The implication for monetary policy is that less pressure 
from monetary instruments is required to impact on wage inflation, reducing the 
costs of a dis-inflationary policy in terms of output and unemployment. 
While changes to the wage bargaining structure reduce the real wage at any rate 
of unemployment, the possibility of negotiating employment structures that result in 
increased productivity means that the overall impact of the ECA on real wages is 
uncertain. By allowing individual bargaining, the ECA has increased labour demand 
and employment. 
Capital market liberalisation 
The Government abolished interest rate controls on deposits and lending in mid- 1984 
and moved Government budget deficit financing to a fully funded periodic tender 
system. The new system replaced a system based on financial institution asset ratios 
and suppression of  market interest rates to make Government offered rates more 
competitive. 
The maintenance of artificially low market interest rates had created increased 
credit  demand  and  discouraged private  sector  saving. This policy  resulted  in 
increased current account imbalances and higher inflationary pressures. This system 
also resulted in financial disintermediation. 
In January 1985 the Government abolished asset ratio requirements. Prior to 
l2 The unemployment benefit is based on an across the board minimum living allowance which is not 
related to an individuals pre-unemployment income. If workers want income insurance, they have to 
access the private insurance market. 
I3This is an empirical question and the author is unaware of any research in New Zealand which 
attempts to measure the effect of these policies on the natural rate. 
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18 1985 compulsory asset ratios were applied to financial institutions, forcing them to 
hold a percentage of their portfolio in Government stock, cash and different sectors 
of industry. These asset ratios were ineffective tools of monetary policy and proved 
to have no real prudential supervisory role, as many financial institutions would have 
preferred  to  hold  higher  cash  stocks  when  real  interest  rates  on  lending  to 
Government and industry were very low or negative. 
The third major market reform was the removal of foreign exchange controls 
and the floating of the New Zealand dollar. Foreign exchange controls were removed 
in December 1984 and the dollar was floated in March 1985. Since 1985, the Reserve 
Bank has  not  actively intervened in  the  foreign exchange market to move the 
exchange rate. However, indirect movements of  the exchange rate through open 
market operations (and statements by the Governor) have become the primary tool of 
monetary policy. 
Changes to the capital markets continue to be made, especially with regard to 
regulations governing foreign direct investment and banking supervision. 
The Reserve Bank Act (1989) 
The Reserve Bank Act of 1964 set the goals of the Reserve Bank as maintaining the 
highest level of  trade, employment and growth possible and the  lowest rate of 
inflation possible. This Act was replaced by  the Reserve Bank Act of 1989 in which 
the sole objective of monetary policy was price stability. The Reserve Bank achieved 
its inflation target in late 1991. However, underlying inflation breached the target in 
the June quarter of  1995. 
The Reserve Bank Act gives the Reserve Bank considerable autonomy in the 
implementation of monetary policy. The Reserve Bank Act provides for a contract to 
be signed by the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, setting 
out the explicit goal of monetary policy and removes the Government from the daily 
running of policy. This is the essence of the Policy Targets Agreement (PTA)'~. 
The Act was designed with the rules versus discretion and natural rate literature in 
1  mind. The Act follows two of McCallum's (1988) rules for an optimal monetary 
I 
I  policy: 
I 
1.  The design of the rule "should recognise the profession's ignorance about the 
short-run effects of monetary policy on output and unemployment, for neither 
theory nor evidence points convincingly to any one of  the many competing 
models of the dynamic interaction between nominal and real variables. 
2.  Its design should also recognise our knowledge about the long-run relation 
between output and monetary expansiveness, namely, that over long spans of 
time output and employment levels will essentially be  independent of  the 
average growth rate of nominal variables." 
The PTA set the goal of a 0-2  percent inflation target range for the annual rate of 
inflation in the headline consumers price index. The PTA also made allowance for 
specific "caveats" which can be invoked if the target is not reached. These caveats 
l4 See Mayes and Chapple (1995) pp. 244-245. 
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19 are; the interest rate components of the CPI and various supply shock components 
such as a terms of trade shock, Government charges or indirect taxes and natural 
disaster or livestock disease outbreak. Apart from the interest rate component, these 
other  shocks  have  to  be  considered  "significant"  which  is  determined  by  a 
mechanical rule. 
The choice of a narrow target zone of annual 0 to 2 percent underlying inflation 
was made for two reasons. The first reason was that it was estimated that the 
Laspeyres CPI contained an upward drift due to biased5, guessed to be in the order 
of  1 percent, meaning that a mid point of the target band of  1 percent would be 
consistent with price stability. The second reason for the selection of such a narrow 
band was because it may result in a credibility effect which would grow if the Bank 
succeeded in attaining and maintaining the target. 
One problem with such a narrow target band is that it may cause instrument 
instability, which  could  result  in  increased fluctuations in  real  variables  and 
eventually force a change in the framework. The Reserve Bank takes a great deal of 
notice of research into the areas of instrument instability and optimal band width16. 
If  there is convincing evidence supporting a change in the target band, the Reserve 
Bank will not hesitate to request a change in the PTA. 
McCallum  (1995)  describes  the  Reserve  Bank  Act  as  designating  "an 
appropriate target for monetary policy -  non-inflationary growth of  a nominal 
variable -  and then provides the Reserve Bank with considerable insulation from day 
to day  political pressures. Such insulation is important because these pressures 
inhibit patience. In addition, the "contract" between the Governor and the Minister 
of Finance provides some reinforcing motivation for the Bank and also constitutes a 
constraint on the Minister, and on the Government more generally, that is at least as 
important as constraining the Bank." 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994) 
Many people are familiar with the failure of the Grarnrn-Rudman Act (  1985) to limit 
the growth of the US public debt and will see the FRA as a similar vain attempt to 
enforce fiscal discipline on politicians in a time inconsistent way. This view would, 
however, ignore the intent of this Act. 
The primary intent of the FRA is to impose fiscal discipline on politicians by 
improving the reporting of  Government policy  and Government forecasts. The 
Minister of Finance is personally responsible to both Parliament and to the people of 
New  Zealand for presenting the goals of  Government and explaining how they 
constitute prudent fiscal policy. It is hoped that improvements in the quality and 
scope of  fiscal reporting will aid markets, and in particular financial markets, to 
impose discipline on fiscal policy. 
The aim of  the Act is to "improve the conduct of fiscal policy by  specifying 
principles of  responsible fiscal management and by  strengthening the reporting 
requirements of the crown ..." In this vein, the Act is similar to the Trustee Act where 
l5 See Crawford (1993), also Mayes and Chapple (1995) pp. 235-238. 
l6  See Fillon ant Tetiow (1993) and Debelle and Stevens (1995) for a discussion of optimal band 
width. 
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20 trustees are personally responsible for the prudent management of trust funds. 
The architects of  the FRA accepted that there was no way  of binding future 
Governments to particular revenue and expenditure paths, and that to attempt to do 
so would be  economically and socially sub-optimal. Instead it is hoped that by 
making Government report its financial position and goals more frequently and 
clearly, financial markets could impose fiscal discipline and voters would make 
superior electoral decisions. The FRA stipulates that the Government must produce 
an Economic and Fiscal Update prior to a general election. 
The FRA sets out prudent fiscal management as being: 
a reduction of  the  total  Crown  debt  to  "prudent  levels"  by  running fiscal 
surpluses, 
once achieved, the Government is to maintain prudent debt levels by  ensuring 
that on average over a reasonable length of time, the total operating expenses of 
the Crown do not exceed its total operating revenues, 
achieve and maintain sufficient levels of  Crown net worth to provide a buffer 
against adverse future events, 
manage prudently the fiscal risks facing the crown, 
pursue policies that are consistent with a reasonable degree of  predictability 
about the level and stability of tax rates for future years. 
To improve the quality of  the Government's fiscal data the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice (GAAP) was adopted. The GAAP implies that the Government 
is required to produce its accounts on an accrual basis rather than a cash basis and 
that the Government must publish a statement of the Crown's net worth. Thus the 
New Zealand Government produces accounts in the same way as the private sector. 
The Minister of  Finance must, no later than 31 March of  each year, publish the 
Budget Policy  Statement. The statement is required to contain forecasts of  the 
following variables; 
crown total operating expenses; 
crown total operating revenues; 
the balance between total operating expenses and revenues; 
the level of Crown total debt; 
the level of Crown total net worth. 
i 
1  The Budget  Policy  Statement must  explain how  the  Government's  long-term 
C  objectives accord with the objective of prudent fiscal management as specified in the 
1  Act. The Budget policy statement must state the broad strategic priorities of  the 
I  Government and  assess how  these accord with  the  objective of  prudent fiscal 
management. If  these objectives do not accord with prudent fiscal management, the 
Minister must explain how long (s)he intends to depart from a policy of  prudent 
fiscal management, how the Government intends to return to prudent management 
and what time frame this departure will last. 
The aim of this statement is thus to provide economic agents with information 
on the goals of Government before the budget passes the legislation into law. The 
statement is also designed to make Government think about the longer term goals of 
policy. 
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21 5  The Future Prospects 
At present New Zealand is experiencing a slowdown in economic activity as a result 
of firm fiscal and monetary policies and the slowdown in international activity. 
However, activity is forecast to reach a trough in the first half of  1996 and then pick 
up strongly as  a result of  fiscal expansion, stable monetary policy, a pick up in 
international activity and completion of a stock cycle. It appears at this stage that a 
soft landing of the economy has been achieved. More to the point, economic activity 
is forecast to trough at an annual rate of growth of around 1.5 percent with possibly 
no negative quarterly growth rates recorded. 
The general consensus is that inflation will ease back near the middle of the 
target range over 1996 and that growth will pick up strongly as a result of the tax 
cutlexpenditure increase scheduled for 1 July 1996 and repeated again on 1 July 
1997. The expected pick up in the US, Japanese and Australian economies over this 
period,  will  also  underpin  the  revival  of  economic growth.  If  the  Treasury's 
predictions are correct, it means that New Zealand will have achieved continual 
positive annual GDP growth from 1992 to 1999 and beyond. This would represent 
possibly the largest economic expansion in the country's history. More importantly, 
this expansion has been, and will continue to be, supported by sound Government 
and business balance sheets, low inflation, low unemployment, strong rates of growth 
in investment, consumption and productivity. 
Table 2 gives The Treasury's latest economic forecasts for the New Zealand 
economy. 
Table 2.  Economic Forecast* 
Annual average % change  1994195  1995196  1996197  1997198  1998199 
March years  Actual  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast 
Private Consumption  4.6  2.9  5.2  5.5  4 
Private Investment  26.1  4.8  2.8  11.5  4 
GDP  6.1  2.6  3.5  4.5  3.5 
Current Account Balance  -  3  -3.7  -3.5  -3.5  -  3 
Unemployment rate (%)  6.6  6.2  5.5  5  5 
90 day bill rate (%)  9.4  8  8.5  8  8.5 
Underlying Inflation  1.9  1.5  1  1.5  1.5 
1  * Source: New Zealand Treasury. December Economic and Fiscal Update (1995) 
! 
Downside risks to these projections are provided by  the possibility of  continual 
weakness in the international environment, stronger than anticipated inflationary 
expectations, and political risk arising from the first proportional representation 
election due in late 1996. 
The strength of the Government budget position has opened up the possibility 
that Government debt can be reduced significantly. Between June 1993 and June 
1996, the Government will have reduced its net public debt by  more than 7 billion 
NZ dollars. The sustainability of the surpluses means that the Government will be 
able to reduce significantly the level of taxes and increase the spending on training, 
health and inferstructure projects, adding to the sustainability of higher economic 
growth. 
5  The Future P~ospects 
At present New Zealand is experiencing a slowdown in economic activity as a result 
of firm fiscal  and monetary policies and the slowdown in international activity. 
However, activity is forecast to reach a trough in the first half of 1996 and then pick 
up strongly as  a result of fiscal expansion, stable monetary policy, a pick up in 
international activity and completion of a stock cycle. It appears at this stage that a 
soft landing of the economy has been achieved. More to the point, economic activity 
is forecast to trough at an annual rate of growth of around 1.5 percent with possibly 
no negative quarterly growth rates recorded. 
The general consensus is that inflation will ease back near the middle of the 
target range over 1996 and that growth will pick up strongly as a result of the tax 
cutlexpenditure increase scheduled for  1 July 1996 and repeated again on 1 July 
1997. The expected pick up in the US, Japanese and Australian economies over this 
period,  will  also  underpin  the  revival  of economic  growth.  If the  Treasury's 
predictions are correct, it means that New Zealand will have achieved continual 
positive annual GDP growth from 1992 to 1999 and heyond. This would represent 
possibly the largest economic expansion in the country's history. More importantly, 
this expansion has been, and will continue to be, supported by sound Government 
and business balance sheets, low inflation, low unemployment, strong rates of  growth 
in investment, consumption and productivity. 
Table 2 gives The Treasury's latest economic forecasts for the New Zealand 
economy. 
Table 2.  Economic Forecast* 
Annual average % change  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99 
Marchyears  Actual  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast  Forecast 
Private Consumption  4.6  2.9  5.2  5.5  4 
Private Investment  26.1  4.8  2.8  11.5  4 
GDP  6.1  2.6  3.5  4.5  3.5 
Current Account Balance  -3  -3.7  -3.5  -3.5  -3 
Unemployment rate (%)  6.6  6.2  5.5  5  5 
90 day bill rate (%)  9.4  8  8.5  8  8.5 
Underlying Inflation  1.9  1.5  1  1.5  1.5 
*  Source: New Zealand Treasury. December Economic and Fiscal Update (1995) 
Downside risks to these projections are  provided by the possibility of continual 
weakness in the international environment, stronger than anticipated inflationary 
expectations, and political risk arising from the first proportional representation 
election due in late 1996. 
The strength of the Government budget position has opened up the possibility 
that Government debt can he reduced significantly. Between June 1993 and June 
1996, the Government will have reduced its net public debt by more than 7 billion 
NZ dollars. The sustainability of the surpluses means that the Government will be 
able to reduce significantly the level of taxes and increase the spending on training, 
health and inferstructure projects, adding to the sustainability of higher economic 
growth. 
22 Table 3 gives the Governments proposed 1996 Budget package which combines 
substantial new expenditure on health care, education and employment training, with 
substantial tax cuts. 
Table 3.  1996 Budget Package * 
Million NZ dollars  1996197  1997198  1998199 
Tax reductions  1000  2100  2300 
Initiatives announced since 1995 budget 
Health  185  170  180 
Employment task force  110  125  120 
Primary teachers wage settlement  65  90  90 
Other  40  40  40 
Provision for initiatives under development  280  520  710 
(including Family assistance, Education, 
New Zealand Superannuation) 
Total  1680  3045  3440 
Budget Surplus 
% of GDP 
Net public debt % of GDP  33.4 %  29.2  %  23.7 % 
* Source: New Zealand Treasury December Economic and Fiscal Update (1995) 
The ultimate sustainability of the reforms in New Zealand and their effects are yet to 
be tested. However, with the gains from the reforms filtering through to the general 
population in the  form of  increasing real  incomes and improved financial and 
employment security, evidence points to their sustainability. 
Table 3 gives the Governments proposed 1996 Budget package which combines 
substantial new expenditure on health care, education and employment training, with 
substantial tax cuts. 
Table 3.  1996 Budget Package * 
MiIlion NZ doIIars  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99 
Tax reduetions  1000  2100  2300 
Initiatives announeed sinee 1995 budget 
Health  185  170  180 
Employment task foree  110  125  120 
Primary teaehers wage settIement  65  90  90 
Other  40  40  40 
Provision for initiatives under development  280  520  710 
(incIuding Family assistanee, Edueation, 
New Zealand Superannuation) 
Total  1680  3045  3440 
Budget Surplus  2929  3150  3993 
%ofGDP  3.30%  3.30%  4% 
Net pub  lie debt % of GDP  33.4 %  29.2%  23.7% 
*  Souree: New Zealand Treasury Deeember Economie and Fiseal Update (1995) 
The ultimate sustainability of  the reforms in New Zealand and their effects are yet to 
be tested. However, with the gains from the reforms filtering through to the general 
population in the form of increasing real  incomes and improved financial  and 
employment security, evidence points to their sustainability. 
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25 Appendix 1 
The following is  an  excerpt  from  the  OECD country report on  New  Zealand 
published in 1994. Summary of  structural reforms since 1984. 




Phasing out of import licencing requirements  1983-1989 
Reduction of import tariffs on Swiss formula from average 
28 to 10 percent  1986-1992 
Further one-third reduction in import tariffs planned  1992-1996 
Removal of special protection features for eighteen specific 
"industry plan" sectors and incorporation into general 
tariff reform programme  1984-1992 
Slower reduction of tariffs on two remaining "special" industries 
(motor vehicles/components and textiles/clothing/footwear)  1987-1996 
International capital controls 
Removal of controls on outward investmentlborrowing  1984 
Free entry of foreign direct investment (rubber-stamped by the 
Overseas Investment Commission, except farmland, offshore 
islands, fishing)  1985-1989 
Very liberal regime for portfolio investmentlrepatriation of profits  1985 
Exchange rate 
Deregulation of foreign exchange trading  1984 
Devaluation 1984 20 percent against a basket of currencies  1984 
Free float of currency on foreign exchange markets 
without direct control  1985 
Monetary policy 
Devotion of monetary policy instruments to dis-inflation with 
a target of "price stability" (0-2  percent price increase by  1992193)  1989 
Independence of Reserve Bank from Government, 
formalised through Reserve Bank Act  1989 
Appendix 1 
The following  is  an  excerpt from  the  OECD  country  report  on  New Zealand 
published in 1994. Summary of structural reforms since 1984. 
International trade and monetary system 
Import protection 
Phasing out of  import licencing requirements 
Reduction of  import tariffs on Swiss formula from average 
28 to 10 percent 
Further one-third reduction in import tariffs pIanned 
Removal of special protection features for eighteen specific 
"industry pIan" sectors and incorporation into general 
tariff reform programme 
Slower reduction of  tariffs on two remaining "special" industries 
(motor vehic1es/components and texti1es/c1othinglfootwear) 
International capital controls 
Removal of  contro1s on outward investmentlborrowing 
Free entry of foreign direct investment (rubber-stamped by the 
Overseas Investment Commission, except farm1and, offshore 
isIands, fishing) 
Very liberal regime for portfolio investmentlrepatriation of profits 
Exchange rate 
Deregu1ation of foreign exchange trading 
Devaluation 1984 20 percent against a basket of  currencies 
Free float of  currency on foreign exchange markets 
without direct contro1 
Monetary policy 
Devotion of monetary policy instruments to dis-inflation with 
a target of "price stability" (0-2 percent price increase by 1992/93) 
Independence of Reserve Bank from Government, 




















Abolition of credit growth guidelines  1984 
Removal of separate requirements for trustee banks, building 
societies, finance houses and stock brokers  1985-1987 
Removal of quantity restrictions and other entry barriers to banking 1985-1986 
End of formal financial controls (reserve ratio requirements, sector 
lending priorities)  1985 
Removal of  interest rate controls  1984 
Abolition of export credit guarantees  1984 
Removal of ownership restrictions on financial institutions  1985 
Liberalisation of stock exchange  1986 
Energy 
Corporatisation of State Coal Mines 
Financial restructuring of oil industry 
Liberalisation of oil company ownership of  service stations 
End of price controls (except on gas) 
Sale of Crown gas exploitatioddistribution interests 
Sale of other Crown energy holdings 
Corporatisation and restructuring of electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution 
Transport 
Removal of restrictions on roadlrail carriage 
End of quantity licencing of trucking 
Corporatisation of state rail, air and bus services 
Tendering of local authority bus services and liberalisation of 
licencing requirements 
Deregulation of taxi industry 
Opening up of domestic aviation industry 
Granting of number of land and on-flying rights to foreign 
airlines in NZ 
Corporatisatiodsale of airports and Airways Corporation 
Corporatisation of ports 
Deregulation of stevedoring industry 
Removal of cabotage on coastal shipping 
Agriculture 
Termination of Supplementary Minimum Prices on 
agricultural products 
Agricultural tax concessions removed 
Termination of concessional financing of primary producer 
stocks held by  producer boards 
Review of compulsory producer board marketing arrangements 
Termination of domestic boards for eggs, milk and wheat 
Industry and service sectors 
Finance 
Abolition of  credit growth guidelines 




societies, fmance houses and stock brokers  1985-1987 
Removal of  quantity restrictions and other entry barriers to banking 1985-1986 
End of formal financial controls (reserve ratio requirements, sector 
lending priorities) 
Removal of interest rate controIs 
Abolition of  export credit guarantees 
Removal of ownership restrictions on financial institutions 
Liberalisation of stock exchange 
Energy 
Corporatisation of State Coal Mines 
Financial restructuring of oil industry 
Liberalisation of oil company ownership of service stations 
End of  price controIs (except on gas) 
Sale of  Crown gas exploitationldistribution interests 
Sale of other Crown energy holdings 
Corporatisation and restructuring of electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution 
Transport 
Removal of restrictions on roadlrail carriage 
End of  quantity licencing of trucking 
Corporatisation of state rail, air and bus services 
Tendering of local authority bus services and liberalisation of 
licencing requirements 
Deregulation of taxi industry 
Opening up of  domestic aviation industry 
Granting of number of  land and on-flying rights to foreign 
airlines in NZ 
Corporatisationlsale of airports and Airways Corporation 
Corporatisation of ports 
Deregulation of stevedoring industry 
Removal of  cabotage on coastal shipping 
Agriculture 
Termination of Supplementary Minimum Prices on 
agricultural products 
Agricultural tax concessions removed 
Termination of  concessional financing of primary producer 
stocks held by producer boards 
Review of  compulsory producer board marketing arrangements 





























27 Industry and service sectors 
Date of 
implementation 
Research and development 
Removal of concessions for research and development to put on 
equal footing with all investment  1984 
Cost-recovery of public R&D work  1985 
Establishment of a contestable pool of public funds 
(Foundation of Research Science and Technology)  1990 
Corporatisation of government research bodies 
(Crown Research Institutes)  1992 
Labour Market 
Introduction of voluntary unionism  1983 
More market based bargaining under Industrial Relations Act 
Amendment: compulsory unionism re-instituted  1984 
Some contestability in union coverage under Labour Relations Act  1987 
Radical reform via Employment Contracts Act (voluntary 
unionism, contestable unions of any size, any arrangements for 
employer/employee bargaining at the joint or individual level)  1991 
Business law 
Establishment of Commerce Act as liberal efficiency-based 
regime to govern mergers and trade practices  1986 
Fair Trading Act governs consumer rights  1986 
Review of securities legislation and takeover law  1988-1991 
Review of whole intellectual property regime (Patent, Copyright, 
Trademark and Design Acts)  1990-1991 
Review of Town and Country Planning  1987-1990 
Resource Management Act to govern more liberal planning and 
environmental legislation  1991 
Crown Minerals Act to clarify property rights to mineral resources  199  1 
Other deregulation measures 
End of wage and price freeze 
Termination of price control, and replacement by  (unused) price 
surveillance powers under Commerce Act 
Removal of quantity licencing in almost all industries, and end 
of quality regulation on most 
End of all state regulated monopoly rights (except letter post, 
air traffic control and milk distribution) 
Removal of some occupational licencing 
Removal of producer co-operative tax advantages 
Termination of restrictions on shop trading hours 
Termination of export market development incentive schemes 
Phase-out of export performance incentives 
Industry and service sectors 
Research and development 
Removal of  concessions for research and deveIopment to put on 
Dateof 
implementation 
equal footing with alI investment  1984 
Cost-recovery ofpublic R&D work  1985 
Establishment of  a contestabIe pool of public funds 
(Foundation ofResearch Science and Technology)  1990 
Corporatisation of  government research bodies 
(Crown Research Institutes)  1992 
Labour Market 
Introduction of voluntary unionism 
More market based bargaining under Industrial Relations Act 
Amendment: compulsory unioni  sm re-instituted 
Some contestability in union coverage under Labour Relations Act 
Radical reform via Employment Contracts Act (voluntary 
unionism, contestable unions of any size, any arrangements for 
employer/empIoyee bargaining at the joint or individualIeveI) 
Business law 
Establishment of  Commerce Act as liberal efficiency-based 
regime to govem mergers and trade practices 
Fair Trading Act govems consumer rights 
Review of securities legisIation and takeover law 
Review of  whoIe intellectual property regime (Patent, Copyright, 
Trademark and Design Acts) 
Review of  Town and Country Planning 
Resource Management Act to govem more liberal planning and 
environmentallegislation 
Crown Minerals Act to c1arify property rights to mineral resources 
Other deregulation measures 
End of wage and price freeze 
Termination ofprice control, and replacement by (unused) price 
surveillance powers under Commerce Act 
Removal of quantity licencing in almost all industries, and end 
of quality regulation on most 
End of all state regulated monopoly rights (except letter post, 
air traffic controI and milk distribution) 
Removal of some occupationallicencing 
Removal of producer co-operative tax advantages 
Termination of restrictions on shop trading hours 
Termination of  export market development incentive schemes 





















1984-1987 Government sector 
Date of 
implementation 
State trading operations 
Removal of almost all state regulated monopoly rights  1984-1989 
Corporatisation of 24 state-owned enterprises (in transport, finance, 
tourism, forestry, broadcasting, utilities and service industries)  1987-1988 
Restructuring to isolate natural monopoly elements of 
State-Owned Enterprises  1989-1991 
Full or partial privatisation of Air New Zealand, Bank of New 
Zealand (A commercial bank not the central bank), Petroleum 
Corporation, Tourist Hotel Corporation, Shipping Corporation, 
Rural Bank, Government Life, Forestry Corporation, Post 
Office Bank, Telecom Corporation, and others  1987-1991 
Further privatisation planned via divestment of  asset sales, 
sales of rights, share rights, etc  1991+ 
Privatisation of Railways, Radio New Zealand  1993-1996 
Requirement for local authorities to corporatise Local Authority 
Trading Enterprises (LATEs) and tender out services  1990-1 99 1 
Encouragement to local authorities to sell holdings in airports, 
port companies and local utilities  1991 
Sale of other assets, e.g. irrigation schemes, fishing rights  1983-1988 
Taxation 
Broadening tax base through "Goods and Services Tax" on 
virtually all final consumption without exception 
(currently 12.5 %) 
Flattening and lowering of personal income tax rate, with top 
rate standardised to corporate tax levels, and aimed to 
minimise poverty traps 
Standardisation and simplification of corporate taxation to 
minimise evasion and cut administration costs 
Removal of most other indirect taxes 
Removal of tax concessions for savings, etc to put on 
neutral footing 
Review of international tax regime 
Expenditure control 
Attempts at reduction in government expenditure, especially in 
areas of administration and industry development 
Assignment of proceeds of sale of state-owned enterprise assets 
to replay public debt 
Public sector management reform through Public Finance Act 
Reform of core government departments on corporate lines 
through the State Sector Act 1988 with separation of policy, 
provision, funding 
User-pays principles for remaining state trading activity 
Government sector 
State trading operations 
Removal of almost all state regulated monopoly rights 




tourism, forestry, broadcasting, utilities and service industries)  1987-1988 
Restructuring to isolate natural monopoly elements of 
State-Owned Enterprises 
FuH or partial privatisation of Air New Zealand, Bank of  New 
Zealand (A commercial bank not the central bank), Petroleum 
Corpora.tion, Tourist Hotel Corporation, Shipping Corporation, 
Rural Bank, Government Life, Forestry Corporation, Post 
Office Bank, Telecom Corporation, and others 
Further privatisation planned via divestment of asset sales, 
sales of rights, share rights, etc 
Privatisationof Railways, Radio New Zealand 
Requirement for local authorities to corporatise Local Authority 
Trading Enterprises (LATEs) and tender out services 
Encouragement to local authorities to seH holdings in airports, 
port companies and local utilities 
Sale of  other assets, e.g. irrigation schemes, fishing rights 
Taxation 
Broadening tax base through "Goods and Services Tax" on 
virtually allfinal consumption without exception 
(currently 12.5 %) 
Flattening and lowering of personal income tax rate, with top 
rate standardised to corporate tax levels, and aimed to 
minimise poverty traps 
Standardisation and simplification of  corporate taxation to 
. minimise evasion and cut administration costs 
Removal of  most other indirect taxes 
Removal of tax concessions for savings, etc to put on 
neutral footing 
Review of international tax regime 
Expenditure control 
Attempts at reduction in government expenditure, especially in 
areas of administration and industry development 
Assignment of  proceeds of sale of state-owned enterprise assets 
to replay public debt 
Public sector management reform through Public Finance Act 
Reform of  core government departments on corporate lines 
through the State Sector Act 1988 with separation of policy, 
provision, funding 



















29 Government sector 
Date of 
implementation 
Expenditure control (continued) 
Redesign of government accounts on more commercial basis, 
accrual accounting, output-based monitoring systems through 
Public Finance Act  1988 
Abolition of 50 quasi-government organisations  1987 
Renewed attempt at reduction in social spending (education, 
health, social welfare, superannuation)  1991 
Fiscal Responsibility Act aims to improve the quality of fiscal 
policy decisions and reporting of fiscal policy  1994 
Social services 
Reform of compulsory education system, based on elected 
Boards of Trustees  1988-1990 
Quasi corporatisation and fee-paying for tertiary 
education institutions  1992 
Integration of state housing assistance into private sector rental 
and mortgage provision  1991 
Tightening of requirements and reduction of levels of 
unemployment benefits and other Government social transfers  1990 
Tightening of requirements, extension of age, and reduction of 
benefits for government funded old age pension scheme  1989- 1992 
Separation of funding provision of state health services and 
establishment of Crown Health Enterprises  1992 
Development of private funding arrangements for health provisions 1992 
Government sector 
Expenditure control (continued) 
Redesign of govemment accounts on more commercial basis, 
accrual accounting, output-based monitoring systems through 
Publie Finance Act 
Abolition of 50 quasi-govemment organisations 
Renewed attempt at reduction in social spending (education, 
health, social welfare, superannuation) 
Fiscal Responsibility Act aims to improve the quality of fiscal 
policy decisions and reporting of fiscal policy 
Social services 
.  Reform of compulsory education system, based on elected 
Boards of  Trustees 








education institutions  1992 
Integration of state housing assistance into private sector rental 
and mortgage provision  1991 
Tightening of  requirements and reduction of levels of 
unemployment benefits and other Govemment social transfers  1990 
Tightening of requirements, extension of age, and reduction of 
benefits for govemment funded old age pension scheme  1989-1992 
Separation of funding provision of state health services and 
establishment of Crown Health Enterprises  1992 
Development ofprivate funding arrangements for health provisions 1992 
30 Appendix 2 
output variables 
The growth rate of production GDP  (44144) and the level of production GDP. 
Real Production GDP (seasonally adjusted)  and its Growth Rate 
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The growth rate of  investment in plant and machinery (44144) and the level of 
investment in plant and machinery. 
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The growth rate of investment in plant and machinery (Q4/Q4) and the level of 
investment in plant and machinery. 
Reallnvestment in Plant and Machinery (_sona/Iy adjusted) and Ita Growth Rate 
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31 External sector indicators 
The terms of trade defined as the price of exports1 price of imports. 
Terms of Trade 
The real exchange rate = ((nominal exchange rate * domestic price level)/ foreign 
price level). The price levels used are the producer price indices of  manufactured 
outputs of the five largest trading partners. The nominal exchange rate used it the 
trade weighted exchange rate index of  the exchange rates of New  Zedands five 
largest trading partners. 
New lealand's Real  Exchange Rate 
110 
External sector indicators 
The terms of trade defined as the price of  exports/ price of imports. 
Terms of Trade 
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The real exchange rate = «nominal exchange rate *  domestic price level)/ foreign 
price level). The price levels used are the producer price indices of manufactured 
outputs of the five largest trading partners. The nominal exchange rate used it the 
trade weighted exchange rate index of the exchange rates of New Zealands five 
largest trading partners. 
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32 Monetary indicators 
90 day Reserve Bank Bills and 10 year Government stock. 
Interest rates 
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 Business Conditions 
Business Confidence based on the Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion (QSBO). 
Business Confidence Survey 
Capacity Utilisation in manufacturing based on the QSBO. 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































March-  - - 
81  -. 
Dec-81 -- 
SeP-82 -- 
Jun-83  -- 
March- - - 
04  -- 
Dec-84 -- 
-5  -- 
Jun-86 -. 
March- j- 
87  -- 
Dec-87 -- 
Sep-BB  -- 
Jun-89  -- 
Mardl- -- 






t-t  Hours worked  Unemployment rate  = 
~  t  t  ~  et  !!!  IG  ~  g:  g:  0  '"  ...  0>  CO  0;;;  C"  8  8  g  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  March-70  g 
Jun-74  March-71  ... 
~  ~ 
m  ~~  ~ 
Dec-75  ... 
~  March-73  ~ 
Sep-76  :z:  '_  ~ 
Jun-71  g  March-74  \  :z::: 
March- :c  March-75  g  = 
78  8'  :  = 
Dee-78  ei:  March-76  (  8'  n 
/;  "ei:  a.  Sep-79  g  March-71  I  /;  Q 
Jun-80  ~  March 78  "  g  ~ 
March- ~  - \  ~ 
81  I  I  i  March-79  '1  ~ 
Dee-81  1  UI  \  a 
:J:  :J:  C  March-80  I  • 
Sep-82  ~  ~  ~  t'  g> 
- K:  '<  March-81  1  <  Jun-83  g  fll  Z  \.  ~ 
March- i  ~  r- March-82  ~  _ 
84  g  ~  ~  ~15 
Dee-84  j.,  ."  March-83  (  (lJ 
g:  ~  ei  ",,_ 
Sep-85  ::  ~  ~  March-84  !r 
a  Q.  _  --..  " 
Jun-86  ..  g  !  .  March-85  \  1-
March- ;;;  0- ... 
87  ~  ::J  March-86  I 
Dee-87  ~  l  I  .....  ~ 
Q.  S'  March-87  l!i 
Sep-88  II  1  __!I! 
R  March-88  :J::J:  ,..:1 
~$  :z:  ~~  '1 
March- g  March-89  0  0  '< 
90  öl  ~~  i 
Dec-90  ~  March-90  ~  ~  a 
o  (t>  ~  :II 
Sep-91  i  March-91  ~  ~  ;. 
Jun-92  -.  March-92  i J 
March- ~ 
93  March-93  ; 
Dee-93  <D 
Sep-94  March-84 
March-95 
Jun-95 +---+---1---+---1---4---1---+---1--_ 
0>  0>  0>  0>  ~  ~  8l  8l  g:  g:  8  - ;;;  ;;;  ~  en  0>8- ::;  '"  ~  '"  t:  en  en  en  0  8  8  8  CS  8  8 
Particlpatlon rate  Empioyment (000) BANK OF FINLAND  DISCUSSION PAPERS 
ISSN 0785-3572 
1/96  Kari T. Sipila A Data Communication Network for Administrative Purposes within 
the EU.  1996.  53 p. ISBN 95  1-686-492-9.  (TK) 
2/96  Veikko Saarinen - Kirsti Tanila -  Kimmo Virolainen  Payment and Settlement Systems 
in Finland 1995.  1996. 60 p. ISBN 95  1-686-493-7.  (RM) 
3/96  Harri Kuussaari  Systemic Risk in the Finnish Payment System: an Empirical 
Investigation. 1996.  32 p. ISBN 951-686-494-5.  (RM) 
4/96  Janne Lauha  OTC-johdannaiset ja Suomen oikeus (OTC Derivatives and Finnish Law 
1996. 98  p. ISBN 951-686-495-3.  (RATA) 
5/96  Jukka Ahonen -  Ilmo Pyyhtia  Suomen teollisuuden rakenne ja hiiirioalttius suhteessa 
muihin EU-maihin (The structure of Finnish industry and its sensitivity to shocks in 
comparison to other EU countries). 1996.  37 p. ISBN 951-686-496-1.  (RP) 
6/96  Pekka Ilmakunnas -  Jukka Topi  Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Influences on 
Entry and Exit of  Firms. 1996.  33 p. ISBN 951-686-497-X.  (TU) 
7/96  Jaakko Autio Korot Suomessa 1862-1952  (Interest Rates in Finland). 1996.  55 p. 
ISBN 95  1-686-498-8.  (TU) 
8/96  Vesa Vihrialti Theoretical Aspects to the Finnish Credit Cycle.  1996.  63  p. 
ISBN 95  1-686-500-3.  (TU) 
9/96  Vesa Vihriall Bank  Capital, Capital Regulation and Lending. 1996.  52  p. 
ISBN 951-686-501-1.  (TU) 
10196  Vesa Vihriiill Credit Growth and Moral Hazard. An Empirical Study of the Causes 
of  Credit Expansion by the Finnish Local Banks in 1986-1990.  1996.  53 p. 
ISBN 95  1-686-502-X.  (TU) 
1  1/96  Vesa Vihriiila Credit Crunch or Collateral Squeeze? An Empirical Analysis of Credit 
Supply of  the Finnish Local Banks in 1990-1992.' 1996.  50 p. ISBN 951-686-503-8. 
(TU) 
12/96  Peter Redward Structural Reform in New  Zealand: A Review. 1996.  35 p. 
ISBN 95  1-686-504-6.  (KT) 
BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
ISSN 0785-3572 
1/96  Kari T. Sipilä A Data Communication Network for Administrative Purposes within 
the EU. 1996. 53 p.  ISBN 951-686-492-9. (TK) 
2/96  Veikko Saarinen - Kirsti Tanila - Kimmo Virolainen  Payment and Settlement Systems 
in Finland 1995. 1996.60 p. ISBN 951-686-493-7. (RM) 
3/96  Harri Kuussaari  Systemic Risk in the Finnish Payment System: an Empirical 
Investigation. 1996.32 p.  ISBN 951-686-494-5. (RM) 
4/96  Janne Lauha  OTC-johdannaiset ja Suomen oikeus (OTe Derivatives and Finnish Law 
1996. 98 p. ISBN 951-686-495-3. (RATA) 
5/96  Jukka Ahonen - Ilmo Pyyhtiä  Suomen teoUisuuden rakenne ja häiriöalttius suhteessa 
muihin EU-maihin (The structure ofFinnish industry and its sensitivity to shocks in 
comparison to other EU countries).  1996. 37 p. ISBN 951-686-496-1. (RP) 
6/96  Pekka Ilmakunnas - Jukka Topi  Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Intluences on 
Entry and Exit ofFirms. 1996.33 p. ISBN 951-686-497-X. (TU) 
7/96  Jaakko Autio Korot Suomessa 1862-1952 (Interest Rates in Finland).  1996.55 p. 
ISBN 951-686-498-8. (TU) 
8/96  Vesa Vihriälä Theoretical Aspects to the Finnish Credit Cycle. 1996.63 p. 
ISBN 951-686-500-3. (TU) 
9/96  Vesa Vihriälä Bank Capital, Capital Regulation and Lending. 1996.52 p. 
ISBN 951-686-501-1. (TU) 
10/96  Vesa Vihriälä Credit Growth and Moral Hazard. An Empirical Study of the Causes 
of Credit Expansion by the Finnish Local Banks in 1986-1990. 1996. 53 p. 
ISBN 951-686-502-X. (TU) 
11/96  Vesa Vihriälä Credit Crunch or CoUateral Squeeze? An Empirical Analysis of Credit 
Supply ofthe Finnish Local Banks in 1990-1992.' 1996.50 p. ISBN 951-686-503-8. 
(TU) 
12/96  Peter Redward Structural Reform in New Zealand: A Review.  1996.35 p. 
ISBN 951-686-504-6. (KT) 